What is UBTech? The Hong Kong-listed humanoid maker selling Walker robots at falling prices, explained in numbers
UBTech Robotics is a Shenzhen company, founded in 2012 and listed in Hong Kong since December 2023 (9880.HK), that has become the largest listed seller of full-size industrial humanoids by disclosed revenue: it sold 1,079 Walker-class robots in 2025 and 921 more in the first half of 2026, when humanoids brought in RMB590.3 million of its RMB1,269.1 million revenue.
MEKAWIRE's calculation from its filings shows revenue per humanoid falling about 16% to RMB641,000, while equity placings, not profits, pay for a stated capacity of more than 6,000 robots a year.
UBTech Robotics sells more full-size humanoid robots than any other company that publishes audited numbers, and it is selling each one for less. The Shenzhen company, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange since December 29, 2023 under code 9880, reported 1,079 full-size humanoids sold in 2025 and 921 in the first six months of 2026, according to its annual and interim results. Humanoids earned RMB590.3 million in the half year, up from RMB38.2 million a year earlier, out of group revenue of RMB1,269.1 million.
Those figures make UBTech the reference point for anyone asking whether humanoids are a business yet. The answer in its filings is mixed: volumes are real, the loss is shrinking, and the capital to keep going still comes from share sales. The sections below explain what the company makes, how the numbers fit together, how it compares with Unitree and AgiBot, and what would change that picture.
A 2012 service-robot company that bet its listing on Walker
UBTech was founded in Shenzhen in March 2012 and spent its first decade on consumer and education robots (Alpha) and wheeled service robots (Cruzr). Its Hong Kong IPO priced at HK$90 a share and raised gross proceeds of HK$1,015.38 million, with E-Town International Holding as sole cornerstone investor, according to its listing announcement. The current line-up runs from the Walker S industrial humanoids and Walker C commercial humanoids to the older service and consumer ranges. The flagship is Walker S2, which the company markets with autonomous battery swapping so that a robot can keep working through a shift; on November 17, 2025 it said Walker S2 had entered mass production and delivery, with orders since the start of that year above RMB800 million.
The question is what those orders turn into once they are delivered and booked.
Humanoids are now almost half of revenue
- Group revenue (RMB m)
- 2,001.0
- 1,269.1
- Full-size humanoid revenue (RMB m)
- 820.6
- 590.3
- Full-size humanoids sold
- 1,079
- 921
- Humanoid share of revenue
- 41.0%
- 46.5%
- Revenue per humanoid (RMB)
- 760,500
- 640,900
- Gross margin
- 37.7%
- 44.7%
- Net loss / loss for period (RMB m)
- 789.8
- 338.8
From UBTech's 2025 annual results and 2026 interim results (HKEX). Revenue per humanoid = humanoid revenue / units sold; share = humanoid revenue / group revenue. Computed by MEKAWIRE. Disclosed, not estimated.
As of Oct 16, 2026
In 2025 full-size humanoid revenue rose 2,203.7% to RMB820.6 million, or 41.0% of group revenue of RMB2,001.0 million. In the first half of 2026 that share reached 46.5%. Gross margin improved from 37.7% for 2025 to 44.7% for the half year, and the loss for the period narrowed 23.0% to RMB338.8 million. One customer accounted for RMB308.5 million, or 24% of half-year revenue, the interim report said, which means a single buyer is worth about half of the humanoid line if most of its spending is on Walker robots.
If margins are rising, why is the price per robot going down?
MEKAWIRE analysis: volume first, price second, capital markets in between
Our thesis: UBTech is trading unit price for volume to become the default factory humanoid supplier in China, and it can do so because Hong Kong equity markets keep funding the gap, not because the robots already pay for themselves.
Dividing humanoid revenue by units sold gives about RMB760,500 per robot in 2025 and RMB640,900 in the first half of 2026, a fall of 15.7%. The first-half unit count already equals 85% of the whole of 2025. Annualised, the half-year volume is about 1,840 robots, roughly 31% of the more than 6,000 units of yearly capacity the company said it had at the end of 2025. Against IDC's estimate of nearly 25,000 humanoids shipped worldwide in the first half, UBTech's 921 units are about 3.7% of the market by volume, but a far larger share by value because most rivals' shipments are smaller research and education robots.
The funding side is just as telling. UBTech raised RMB5,779.9 million from three H-share placings in 2025, 7.3 times its 2025 net loss of RMB789.8 million, and it has run five placings since the IPO (October and November 2024, February, July and November 2025). In November 2025 it earmarked 75% of a HK$3.11 billion placing for investing in or acquiring upstream and downstream companies, and in April 2026 it closed a RMB1.67 billion purchase of 43.01% of Shenzhen-listed Zhejiang Fenglong Electric, naming seven of eight directors.
- UBTech Robotics
- HKEX 9880 (Dec 2023)
- RMB1,269.1m, H1 2026 (+104.2%)
- 921 full-size humanoids sold in H1 2026
- Unitree Robotics
- SSE STAR 688836 (Aug 19, 2026)
- RMB1,152.25m, H1 2026 (+48.5%)
- IPO raised RMB6.10bn; about RMB61.0bn value at issue price
- AgiBot
- Unlisted
- More than RMB1bn, FY2025
- 10,000th robot off the line in 2026
- Market (IDC)
- n/a
- More than $740m, H1 2026
- Nearly 25,000 humanoids shipped worldwide in H1 2026; Chinese vendors over 95%
From company filings and announcements and IDC's Sept 29, 2026 release, as recorded in MEKAWIRE. UBTech's H1 revenue is 10% above Unitree's. Revenue figures include non-humanoid products.
As of Oct 16, 2026
The strongest counter-argument is in the margin line. If price cuts were pure discounting, gross margin would fall; instead it rose seven points. That suggests the lower revenue per unit reflects a shift in mix toward cheaper configurations or larger fleet orders, and that UBTech's cost per robot is falling faster than its price. We think both are true, and that the filing data cannot yet separate them.
The bull case: auto and electronics factories move from pilots to fleets, the single large customer becomes several, capacity utilisation climbs above half and the company reaches break-even on volume. The bear case: price falls outrun cost cuts once Unitree and AgiBot push full-size models into factories, the top customer slows orders, and UBTech has to keep issuing shares at lower prices to fund capacity it cannot fill.
That leaves three dates that will test the view.
What to watch
UBTech's 2026 annual results, due by the end of March 2027, will show whether second-half volume kept pace with the first and whether revenue per robot stabilised. Any new placing announcement on HKEX will show how much of the plan still depends on equity. And Fenglong's first annual report under UBTech control will show whether the RMB10 million 2026 profit guarantee holds, the first test of the manufacturing acquisition strategy. The sharpest open question is whether the 24% customer is a fleet buyer or a one-time order.
- RMB5,779.9m raised from three placings in 2025, 7.3x the 2025 net loss; five placings since IPO
- More than 6,000 full-size humanoids a year (end-2025); H1 2026 annualised run rate about 31%
- 43.01% of Zhejiang Fenglong Electric for RMB1.67bn, completed Apr 24, 2026
- 1,079 full-size units in 2025; 921 in H1 2026
- RMB820.6m in 2025 (41.0% of revenue); RMB590.3m in H1 2026 (46.5%)
- Shenzhen, March 2012; HKEX Main Board 9880 since Dec 29, 2023 (IPO HK$90, HK$1,015.38m gross)
- Revenue RMB1,269.1m (+104.2%); gross margin 44.7%; loss RMB338.8m (-23.0%)
- Largest customer RMB308.5m, 24% of H1 2026 revenue
- RMB760,500 (2025) to RMB640,900 (H1 2026), -15.7%
Why it matters
UBTech is the only full-size humanoid maker with two consecutive periods of audited unit sales above 900, so its filings are the closest thing the industry has to a public price and volume curve. If its revenue per robot keeps falling while margin rises, it shows cost learning is real; if margin turns down, the price war has started before demand is proven.
Investors comparing Figure's $39 billion private valuation or Agility's planned listing with a business that books revenue can use UBTech as the benchmark for what a few thousand factory humanoids are actually worth in sales.
Rival analysis
Unitree booked similar half-year revenue (RMB1,152.25m) with a mix weighted to quadrupeds and smaller humanoids sold to labs, and it now has RMB5.9bn of net IPO money. AgiBot reported more than RMB1bn of 2025 revenue and a 10,000-robot milestone, but no audited unit split. UBTech's edge is the factory-customer base and battery-swapping Walker S2; its weakness is concentration in one large customer and dependence on equity.
Outside China, Figure and Agility sell no list-priced industrial humanoid, and Tesla has not reported external Optimus sales, so UBTech's unit economics have no Western audited comparator yet.
Valuation context
UBTech funds itself through repeated H-share placings: five since listing, including HK$3.11bn in November 2025 and RMB5.78bn across three placings in 2025. Unitree's STAR listing priced at 219 times 2025 earnings, which shows how much the onshore market pays for profitable humanoid exposure. UBTech is still loss-making, so its valuation rests on revenue growth and capacity rather than earnings.
Supply-chain implications
The Fenglong deal gives UBTech control of a listed manufacturer and a base for vertical integration of motors and components. Low Chinese component costs (reducers, actuators, batteries) are what allow revenue per robot to fall while margin rises. Any export restriction on Chinese robots, such as US limits on Chinese robot imports, mainly affects future overseas growth, not the current domestic factory base.
Signals to watch
1) 2026 annual results by March 31, 2027: second-half unit sales and revenue per robot. 2) Any new HKEX placing notice: size and discount. 3) Fenglong 2026 profit against the RMB10m guarantee. 4) Disclosure of the identity or sector of the 24% customer.
Analyst view
Thesis: UBTech is trading price for volume and relying on equity markets to fund the gap. Confidence medium. The unit and revenue data are audited and solid; the cause of the 15.7% fall in revenue per robot (mix versus discounting) cannot be separated from public filings, and that is the variable that decides the bull or bear case.
Questions you should be asking
What share of H1 2026 humanoid units went to the largest customer? Is lower revenue per robot driven by a cheaper configuration or by fleet pricing? What utilisation does management expect for the 6,000-unit capacity in 2027? How much of the Fenglong purchase is meant to produce humanoid components in-house?